This report examines both the historical development and current situation of Syrians working in Lebanon through the analysis of policies established and implemented by the Lebanese government. While the report is not an assessment of these policies, it nevertheless reflects on its impact on Syrians' working conditions and livelihoods. In this vein, this report notably focuses on emerging dynamics of increased informality, exploitation, and dependence.
History of Syrian migration to Lebanon
The first wave of economic migration from Syria to Lebanon In the 1990s, Lebanon had lost most of its glamour, as the country was suffering the consequences of its 15-year-long 11 At some point, up to one million Syrian men came to Lebanon yearly. See Chalcraft, op.cit., 2009, p.55. 12 "Voluntarily" in the sense that Syrian workers were not slaves, nor refugees. It was their own choice to emigratealthough they might have been driven by (financial) necessity. See Chalcraft, op.cit., 2009 , p.78. 13 Lebanon Support, op.cit., 2015 Lebanon Support, op.cit., 2016, p.7. 14 Chalcraft, op.cit., 2009, p.15; Lebanon Support, op.cit., 2015, p.8. 15 Between 1958 and 1970 , they invested around 500,000,000 LPB, mainly in real estate, banks and import, contributing to the remarkable economic growth of these sectors. Moreover, being unleashed from a protectionist regime in Syria to the liberal Lebanon, these new immigrants were particularly successful due to their willingness to take financial risks; they came to be known as "learning capitalists. 16 Chalcraft, op.cit., 2009, p.78. 17 Ibid., p.16. At the same time, in combination with the agrarian reforms and nationalisation of banks, firms and trade conducted by the leading Ba'ath party in the 1960s, many Syrian from the wealthy, entrepreneurial social class moved their business and families to Beirut and invested in Banks and real estate. Between 1958 and 1970, they invested around 500 000 000 LPB in real estate, banks and importations mainly, hence contributing to the remarkable economic growth of these sectors. See Picard, op.cit., 2016, p.140. 18 Ibid., p.63-64. In addition to the treaty, the outwards-oriented Lebanese liberal economy was not only built on cheap and highly productive foreign labourers, but was also dependent on it.
Although almost one third of the Lebanese labour force was "basically poor, uneducated and engaged in casual, unskilled or semi-skilled labour," 24 Syrians were hired over Lebanese.
The primary reason for this is that Syrian employees could be paid up to 40% less than their Lebanese colleagues 25 -that is, because Syrians working in the agricultural sector, which traditionally hosted large numbers of Syrian workers, were excluded from the Lebanese Labour Code, which is the leading law outlining labour protection (amongst which a minimum wage) on Lebanese territory for nationals and foreigners. Second, earned money was remitted to Syria, where costs were less high, 27 so their decreased wage was significantly more valuable to them than to Lebanese, and they were less likely to protest. Although daily expenses in Lebanon were significantly higher, costs were kept to a minimum, as Syrians tended to live 5 or 6 to a room, or in "shantytowns surrounding Beirut, in miserable dwellings made of old wooden boxes, tarred cartons and sheet metal." 28 A third reason to hire Syrians over Lebanese was that after 1963, employers were -in principle 29 -obligated to register Lebanese employees in the newly created Social Security system, protecting employees against sickness, job loss, retirements, accidents, et cetera. For Syrians, a work permit or contract was not necessary, let alone social protection.
Moreover, Syrians came to be known for their manipulability and their ability to work hard. As a result, low-paid and unorganised labour for Syrians was encouraged, as hiring them implied lower costs and less paperwork for their employers. It was reported in 1972 that Syrian workers in Lebanon "comprised at least 90% of manual labourers and around 70% of more skilled labour." 30 Although Syrians were formally obligated to pay registration fees and taxes, the Ministry of Labour, consisting mostly of Syrian loyalists, turned a blind eye. 31 An additional factor that can be attributed to the prolonged settlement of Syrians in Lebanon is that, at the end of the mandate period, in response to several economic crises and political developments, many families spread and migrated in several parts of the Levant, which often led to the building of strong networks and solidarity beyond the border. 32 The first possibility is on the basis of a UNHCR registration.
Bilateral agreements and their impact on the Lebanese labour market
However, since May 6, 2015, UNHCR Lebanon has temporarily suspended new registration upon the government's request.
Those who were already registered are requested to sign a pledge to not work that excludes them from the labour market.
As compensation, 65% of the refugees receive monthly food vouchers distributed by the World Food Programme (WFP). There is a significant difference, however, between refugees and migrants. These terms should not be used interchangeably, as doing so carries significant consequences on refugees' legal status, their right to work, and their protection.
That is, those wishing to enter the Lebanese labour market must ultimately obtain a legal status as migrant, meaning that they lose access to various services and forms of assistance provided by the UNHCR and other aid organisations.
On the other hand, those who choose to maintain their "UN refugee" status and concurrent protection are excluded from the labour market. This policy presents Syrians with the difficult choice between access to livelihoods or access to (insufficient) protection and assistance. 
Increased dependency
Second, increased formalisation leads to increased dependency within work relations. This has been mainly expressed to us in relation to three main figures of "authority;" the landlords, the shaweesh, and the kafeel. Our fieldwork has
shown that most of the money earned by refugees is spent on rent. Interlocutors explained that rents are lower in tented settlements, especially when the "ground is bad." 111
They also described that landlords tend to increase the rent when they know the tenants are Syrian. Most Syrian refugees who work do so on an irregular basis, 112 which adds to the burden of paying rent and the fear of losing their house, and forces them to live in substandard housing. A janitor in Beirut explains: Second, many of our respondents described the problematic role that the shaweesh has within informal settlements.
I was working in construction in
The shaweesh, who can be Lebanese, but is more often a Syrian refugee, acts as a mediator between the landowners, refugees, NGOs, and security services. 115 On the one hand, interlocutors describe him as a person who forces people -including children -in the camp to work by hiring them out to nearby restaurants, shops, or farms. In this case, residents do not pay rent but their salary is paid through the shaweesh, who in return gets a share of their
salary. An old female worker described: On the other hand, the shaweesh is also often the only authoritative figure able to protect many Syrians against being fired or not getting paid, while also being responsible for aid distribution from NGOs. NGO workers explained that although most refugees realise that they cannot be forced to work, because the shaweesh is "someone like them," they also emphasised that NGO protection is not enough, or that they cannot find jobs without the shaweesh. The third figure of dependency is the kafeel. Our respondents underline that there is a power discrepancy when they have a work-based pledge of responsibility. First, because their legal status and their employment relies on the kafeel.
Second, because a kafeel can withdraw his sponsorship at any time. This makes Syrian workers highly dependent on a kafeel in several ways. Interlocutors also described difficulties in finding a kafeel in the first place. This is due in part to the kafeel's legal responsibility towards Syrian refugees and their families -which obviously is a deterrent for many -but also because finding a kafeel is highly costly. Most interlocutors maintain that kafeels can ask for exorbitant amounts of money in order to sign a pledge of responsibility, ranging from USD 200 up to USD 1000.
A respondent explained:
The In addition, kafeels appear to get away with forced labour, exploitation, and harassment. Respondents point out that a kafeel has the power to pay lower wages, or none at all. At the same time, he or she can restrict the Syrian's freedom to pursue employment elsewhere. 
Harsh and precarious working conditions
Not only did the new regulatory framework contribute to illegality and expanded dependence, the lack of legal pres- Not only are children forced to work under harsh conditionsboth physically and mentally -but they are also deprived of their basic right to education. One of our interlocutors warned that "a complete generation will be illiterate if they In addition, NGO workers report an increasing network of In sum, we can conclude that while recent policy measures were adopted in an attempt to formalise and control Syrian presence in the labour market, they have mainly added to the existing unstable and informal setting. Our research findings show a vicious circle emerging from these policy measures, which reinforces existing structures of informality, dependence, and exploitation. In terms of a long-term perspective, experts unanimously call not only for a proper, organised market and job creation -in which Lebanon would benefit from tax money and Syrians from protection -but especially for a more human rights-based approach.
5 Conclusion
